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INTRODUCTION

On June 28, 2004, the United States Supreme Court released its
much awaited decisions in the cases posing a challenge to the Executive's self-professed authority to detain and indefinitely hold individuals designated as "enemy combatants."l The cases arose from the "war
on terrorism" that was launched after the attack on the United States
on September 11, 2001. 2 When each decision is looked at individually,

* Associate, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel, LLP; Prospective Law Clerk to the Hon. H.
Emory Widener, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; BA. with Honors, Johns Hopkins
University 1998; J.D. cum laude, Georgetown University Law Center 2004; M.D. with Recognition,
State University of New York at Stony Brook School of Medicine 2005.
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). Also, on June 29, 2004, the Supreme Court summarily vacated
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in another terrorism case. Bush v.
Gherebi, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004) (mem.). Together, in this Article, these cases are referred to as the
"Enemy Combatant Cases."
2. As of the day the decisions came down (and ofthe day of writing of this Article), the "war
on terrorism" was ongoing with no end in sight.
623
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the result seems to make sense and, given the outcome (affording
detainees rights ofjudicial review), feels good. Yet when these decisions
are looked at collectively, it is hard to believe that they were issued by
the same complement of Justices, much less on the same day. Moreover, when the decisions rendered on June 28, 2004, are read in
concert with previous decisions dealing with the habeas corpus rights
of non-citizen detainees, the legal landscape becomes quite muddled.
This Article seeks to show inconsistencies in the three Enemy Combatant Cases, as well as the potentially catastrophic interaction of these
cases with Zadvydas v. Davis, a case decided in 2001. Part II of this
Article describes the historical and political background of these cases
and summarizes the Supreme Court's opinion in each case. Part III
points out the tension between these decisions and suggests that it is
impossible for all three to be implemented as written. Part IV addresses
the far-reaching implications of Rasui v. Bush on the present and future
military operations and argues that that decision has the potential to
wreak havoc on the military's ability to effectively detain and interrogate terrorists and prisoners of war (PaWs). Part V addresses the
interaction of Rasui and Zadvydas and suggests that if the decisions are
meant to be read in concert, they may require a highly implausible
result of releasing individuals whom the military considers to be
dangerous into the very country that these individuals wish to destroy.
Part VI proposes a restricted construction on these decisions so as to
limit the potential damage that these decisions can cause. The Article
concludes its analysis in Part VII.
II.

THE CAsES AND THEIR BACKGROUND

On the bright morning of September 11, 2001, the world shook. The
United States was attacked by terrorists associated with al-Qaeda, a vast,
worldwide terrorist network. Two planes crashed into the World Trade
Center buildings in New York, bringing both buildings down, while a
third plane crashed into the Pentagon. Yet another plane, headed for
the U.S. Capitol or the White House, was brought down by courageous
passengers. In all, over 3,000 people perished in the attack. On
September 14, 2001, Congress unanimously passed a resolution authorizing the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.,,3 On October 7, the

3. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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u.s. forces began a bombing campaign against Afghanistan,4 a country
then ruled by the radical Islamist Taliban regime-a regime harboring
the mastermind of September 11, 2001, attacks, Osama bin Laden. 5 It is
in this context that the Enemy Combatant Cases arose. This Part will
describe Hamdi, Padilla, and &Sui, the Enemy Combatant Cases.
A.

Hamdi v. Rurnsfeid

After the United States started military operations in Afghanistan, as
would be expected, it captured a number of individuals who allegedly
were (and are) Taliban and al-Qaeda supporters. 6 Among them was
Yaser Esam Hamdi, a Saudi national. 7 Like many other foreign-born
individuals captured in Afghanistan and suspected of being members
of the Taliban or al-Qaeda, Mr. Hamdi was detained and initially
transported to Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. s
Officials soon discovered, however, that in addition to being a Saudi
national, Mr. Hamdi also laid a claim to U.S. citizenship, by virtue of
having been born in Louisiana. 9 Once U.S. officials discovered that Mr.
Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, he was transferred from Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base and into the United States proper. lO The Department of
Defense chose the military brig in Norfolk Naval Station in Norfolk,
Virginia/ 1 as his new place of confinement. The U.S. government
further determined that Mr. Hamdi was an "enemy combatant" and
consequently should remain detained in accordance with the laws and
customs of war. 12
While being detained, Hamdi was not permitted to meet with his

4. David Rohde, Thunderous Blasts and Bright Flashes Mark Kabul Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2001, atAI.
5. Id. atB5.
6. See Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Detention Camp; U.S. to Hold Taliban
Detainees in 'the Least Worst Place, 'N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at B6 ("As of today, the United States
was holding 45 fighters from AI Qaeda and the Taliban.").
7. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 534 (E.D. Va. 2002).
8. Id. at 529. For further details about Camp X-Ray, see infra Part II.C.
9. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 2003). Mr. Hamdi has since renounced his
U.S. citizenship as part of the deal with the Government. See infra note 41.
10. Id.
11. Id. Hamdi was thereafter transferred to the military brig in Charleston Naval Brig in
Charleston, South Carolina. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2636.
12. Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 601.
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attorneys or anyone else, including family members,13 nor was he
indicted or arraigned on any charges in either civilian or military
proceedings.14 In essence he was being held as a POW but without the
rights that the Geneva Convention accords to POWS. I5 Furthermore,
the Government announced that the detention would last indefinitely,
or at least until the Government itself makes a determination that
access to counsel and the courts is warranted. I6
On May 10, 2002, a federal public defender, Frank Dunham, filed a
habeas corpus petition challenging the Government's detention of
Hamdi as an enemy combatant and naming as petitioners both Hamdi
and himself as Hamdi's next friend. I7 The petition requested an order
from the court requiring the Government to allow the public defender
to meet privately with Mr. Hamdi, to cease all interrogation of Mr.
Hamdi, and to release Mr. Hamdi from "unlawful custody.,,18 The
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the petition
insofar as it requested that Mr. Hamdi be allowed to privately meet with
counsel. I9 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
but did not address the propriety of treating Mr. Hamdi as an "unlawful
combatant.,,2o Instead, the court held that the public defender did not
have standing to file a habeas corpus petition on Mr. Hamdi's behalf. 21
While Mr. Durham's petition on behalf ofMr. Hamdi was pending in
the Fourth Circuit, Mr. Hamdi's father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a
nearly identical habeas corpus petition on behalf of his son, claiming to
be his next friend. 22 Once again, the district court granted the petition

13. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 368 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz,]., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en bane) ("Nor has the Executive allowed Hamdi to appear in court, consult with
counsel, or communicate in any way with the outside world.").
14. Id.
15. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
118 [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3406, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 [hereinafter Geneva Convention] ("Prisoners of
war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.") (emphasis
added). As the duration of hostilities is indefinite (in the sense that no one knows a priori how long
a particular war will last), so too can detention under the Convention be indetinite. See also Hamdi,
124 S. Ct. at 2641-42 (addressing the issue of indefinite detention in light of the Geneva
Convention); cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468-69 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting Hamdi's
Geneva Convention claims).
16. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2636.
17. Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 60l.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 602 (detailing the district court's order).
20. See id. at 607.
21. See id. at 600.
22. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2002).
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insofar as it requested that Mr. Hamdi be allowed to meet privately with
an attorney.23 Once again, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that
the district court failed to properly consider the detainee's status as an
"enemy combatant," or to give proper deference to the decision of the
President and Congress regarding the conduct of war and foreign
policy.24 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for reconsideration. 25
Upon remand, having addressed the issues identified by the Fourth
Circuit, the district court ordered the Government to produce support
for its contention that Hamdi was an "enemy combatant."26 The
Government produced a declaration (the Mobbs Declaration) by Michael Mobbs-"an unelected, otherwise unknown, government 'advisor"'27-attesting to the circumstances of Mr. Hamdi' s capture. 28 The
district court found the Mobbs Declaration to be insufficient and
ordered the Government to produce additional documentation including information on the identity of the individuals who actually made
the ultimate decision to designate Mr. Hamdi as an "enemy combatant"
and the criteria used for such designation. 29 Yet again, the Fourth
Circuit reversed, holding that the Government's affidavit was sufficient
and that, in any event, the district court did not have jurisdiction to
question the Executive's designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant. 30 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit held that the Geneva Convention affords Mr. Hamdi no rights to have his "enemy combatant" status
reviewed by a court of law. 31
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address, inter alia, whether
the Constitution permit[s] Executive officials to detain an
American citizen indefinitely in military custody in the United
States, hold him essentially incommunicado and deny him
access to counsel, with no opportunity to question the factual
basis for his detention before any impartial tribunal, on the sole
ground that he was seized abroad in a theater of the War on

23. See id. at 281 (detailing the district court's order).
24. ld. at 281-82.
25. ld. at 284.
26. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002).
27. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335,368 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz,J., dissenting from denial
ofrehearing en bane).
28. See id.; infra note 42.
29. Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 528-29.
30. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
31. ld. at 468-69.

2005]

627

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Terrorism and declared by the Executive to be an "enemy
combatant"?32
On June 28,2004, a splintered Court announced itsjudgment,33 with
opinions transcending the usual "liberal-conservative" divide.
Although no opinion garnered the necessary five votes to become an
opinion of the Court, five Justices agreed that the indefinite 34 detention of American citizens, in the narrow circumstances of this case, was
permissible. 35 At the same time, however, six Justices concluded that,
contrary to the Fourth Circuit's view, Mr. Hamdi is indeed entitled to
challenge his designation as an "enemy combatant" and to have an
attorney for the purpose of such proceedings. 36 The Court, however,
did specify that given the extraordinarily sensitive nature of the military
information, and the deference that the courts owe to the Executive in
his determination on the conduct of war, the onus in challenging the
"enemy combatant" designation should be placed on the detainee. 37
Furthermore, the Court allowed the Government to rely on evidence
that in most other proceedings would be deemed undependable (e.g.,
hearsay).38
The plurality opinion did concede that the challenge to the "unlawful combatant" status need not proceed in the civilian courtrooms, but
may instead be adjudicated in the military tribunals. 39 If such is the

32. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2003 WL 23170355 (Oct. 31,
2003); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (mem.) (order granting certiorari).
33. The case produced five opinions. The plurality opinion was authored byJustice O'Connor
and joined by the ChiefJustice and Justices Kennedy and Breyer.Justice Souter,joined by Justice
Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented. Justice
Thomas also dissented, though on different grounds than Justice Scalia.
34. The plurality opinion did make a cautionary footnote that "indefinite" means only until
cessation of hostilities, which in turn may last for the course of Mr. Hamdi's lifetime. (Mter all,
"hostilities" between Israelis and Palestinians have been "ongoing" for almost 60 years. Although
one hopes that the U.S. military operations in Mghanistan would conclude well short of the
sixty-year mark, the possibility that the operations will carry on for years, if not decades, certainly
cannot be ruled out.) Because the Court took note of the fact that the hostilities in Mghanistan
are still ongoing, it saw no need to delve deeper into the propriety of holding a citizen indefinitely
when no active military operations are conducted, but the country nevertheless is in a heightened
state of alert due to terrorist threats.
35. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641-42 (plurality opinion); id. at 2680 (Thomas,]., dissenting).
36. See id. at 2651-52 (plurality opinion); id. at 2660 (Souter,]., concurring injudgment).
37. 124 S. Ct. at 2649.
38. [d.
39. [d. at 2651-52. Technically, this part of the opinion did not command the majority of the
Court. See id. at 2660 (Souter,]., concurring in judgment) (specifically disavowing agreement with
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case, the plurality would probably concede that Mr. Hamdi's choice of
lawyers could be limited. 40 In short, the Court was quite deferential to
the powers of the Executive, but not to the point where it ceded to the
Executive the sole, unreviewable, and unaccountable power to indefinitely detain U.S. citizens. 41
B.

Rumsfeld v. Padilla

The second case decided by the Supreme Court concerned another
U.S. citizen classified as an "enemy combatant." Although Jose Padilla
came to be held in the same military jail and under the same status as
Yaser Hamdi, the circumstances of his arrival there were quite different.
Jose Padilla was born in New York and raised in Chicago. 42 He started
having problems with the law at a very early age and was arrested for
murder when he was fourteen. 43 He was tried as ajuvenile, convicted,
and incarcerated until his eighteenth birthday.44 He later moved to
Florida, where he was once again arrested and convicted on a handgun
charge. 45 Sometime between 1993 and 1994, Mr. Padilla converted to
Islam and started referring to himself as Ibrahim Padilla. 46 In 1998, he
moved to Egypt. 47 Mr. Padilla subsequently traveled to Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, and Mghanistan. 48 It is alleged that during these travels Mr.
Padilla met and became involved with senior leaders of al-Qaeda 49 and

the majority on this point). However, given Justice Thomas' view that Hamdi is not entitled to any
additional process, it is likely that he would agree that a truncated process would not be
constitutionally offensive.
40. For example, the Government may impose a requirement that the attorneys be able to
obtain security clearance and/or be on active military duty.
41. Mter the Court handed down its decision, Mr. Hamdi and the Federal Government
entered an agreement whereupon Mr. Hamdi renounced his U.S. citizenship and was sent to
Saudi Arabia. Mr. Hamdi agreed to certain limitations on his activities as part of the deal. SeeJoei
Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, Held 3 Years by U.S., Saudi Goes Home, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 13,2004,
at 2.
42. See Declaration ofMichael H. Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary ofDefense for Policy '\I 4
[hereinafter Mobbs Declaration], available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/
padillabush82702mobbs.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
43. [d.
44. /d.
45. [d.
46. [d.
47. [d.
48. [d.

49. [d. '\I'll 5-6.
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that he became a part of the plan to detonate a "dirty bomb"50 in the
United States. 51 On May 8,2002, Mr. Padilla traveled from Pakistan to
Chicago O'Hare Airport at which point he was, pursuant to a court
order, detained by the U.S. Marshal Service as a material witness to a
federal grand jury investigation. 52 The grand jury was empanelled in
the Southern District of New York, and accordingly, Mr. Padilla was
held in New York City's Metropolitan Correctional Center. 53
While Mr. Padilla was being held on a material witness warrant, the
district court appointed an attorney to represent him. 54 Donna Newman, the court-appointed attorney, was allowed to confer with Mr.
Padilla55 and subsequently moved to vacate the material witness warrant. However, on June 9, 2002, while the motion to vacate was
pending, President Bush classified Mr. Padilla as an "enemy combatant" and ordered the Secretary of Defense to detain Mr. Padilla. 56
Secretary Rumsfeld then ordered Mr. Padilla held at the Charleston
Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina. 57 Mter Mr. Padilla was
moved to South Carolina, Ms. Newman filed a habeas petition onJune
11,2002, as Mr. Padilla's "next friend" in the Southern District of New
York.58 Secretary Rumsfeld was named as the respondent in the petition. 59
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, like
the district court in Hamdi's case, held that Mr. Padilla's lawyer can
style herself as "next friend" and, accordingly, had standing to pursue

50. "Dirty bomb" is a regular explosive device that is enhanced with radioactive material.
Although not a true nuclear weapon (because instead of causing a nuclear reaction, a "dirty
bomb" merely causes the fallout of "prepackaged" nuclear material), the damage from a "dirty
bomb" exceeds that of the regular explosive device due to the release of nuclear material. For a
quick summary on "dirty bombs," see U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N, Fact Sheet on Dirty Bombs, available
at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ doc-collections/fact-sheets/ dirty-bombs.html (last visited Nov.
29,2004).
51. Mobbs Declaration, supra note 42 'll'll 7-8.
52. Id. 'll11.
53. See Padilla ex rei. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
54. Id.
55. Id. Additionally, after the habeas petition was filed, Ms. Newman conferred with Mr.
Padilla's relatives and with government representatives on Padilla's behalf. Id. at 572.
56. Id. at 571; see also President's Order to the Secretary of Defense to Detain Jose Padilla Uune 9,
2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/ docs/ padilla/ padillabush60902det.pdf (last
visited July 31,2004).
57. See 233 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
58. Id.
59. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2716. The petition also named President Bush and Melanie Marr,
Commander of the Charleston Naval Brig, as respondents. Id.
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the habeas petition. 60 Additionally, the district court rejected the
Government's argument that Secretary Rumsfeld was not a proper
respondent and that the warden of the Charleston Naval Brig should
have been named instead. 61 The district court then ordered the
Government to allow Mr. Padilla access to an attorney62 and the
opportunity to rebut the Government's contention that he is an
"enemy combatant.,,63 The Government appealed, and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, one judge dissenting, affirmed the
district court. The Court of Appeals also ordered Secretary Rumsfeld to
release Mr. Padilla from military custody and transfer him to civilian
authorities. 64 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve, inter
alia, whether the District Court for the Southern District of New York
had personal jurisdiction over the proper respondent to the habeas
petition. 65
On June 28, together with the Hamdi decision, the Supreme Court
rendered its judgment in Rumsfeld v. Padilla. In a 5-4 decision,66 the
Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that the warden of Charleston Naval Brig was the proper respondent, rather than Secretary
Rumsfeld. 67 Thus, the Court continued, the petition should have been
brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina and
not in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. 68
In reaching this decision, the Court recognized that allowing a prisoner
to sue the high-level official in any jurisdiction where that official would
be amenable to long-arm jurisdiction, instead of suing the immediate
captor locally, would encourage "rampant forum shopping" and result

60. Newman, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
61. Id. The district court actually dismissed Commander Marr as the respondent because the
court did not view her as a necessary party to the dispute. Id. at 583.
62. Id. at 610.
63. Id. at 599-600.
64. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 698-99 (2d Cir. 2003). It is at this point that the Second
Circuit disagreed with the District Court. While the District Court was of the view that the
President was authorized and could detain U.S. citizens as "enemy combatants," provided that
these individuals can contest the designation, the Court of Appeals held otherwise. Compare
Newman, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 588, with Padilla, 352 F.3d at 724. For the purpose of the Supreme
Court's opinion, however, that distinction did not matter.
65. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (mem.) (order granting certiorari).
66. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the decision in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens'
dissenting opinion. Additionally, Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in which Justice
O'Connor joined. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2711.
67. Id. at 2721-22.
68. Id. at 2727.
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in "district courts with overlapping jurisdiction, and the very inconvenience, expense, and embarrassment Congress sought to avoid when it
added the jurisdictional limitation [to the habeas corpus statute] 137
years ago.,,69
In footnote nine, the majority did recognize that in the past it
allowed suits against high level officials when the immediate jailer was
outside of the jurisdiction of any U.S. district court. However, the Court
carefully noted that in the past this exception applied to U.S. citizens
only.70 As detailed below, that last limitation apparently no longer
holds.

C.

Rasul v. Bush

Rasul v. Bush was the third of the Enemy Combatant Cases. The facts
of the case closely track those of Hamdi, with the exception that none of
the individuals involved are U.S. citizens. The individuals named in
Rasul (and others similarly situated) are all foreign nationals, captured
in Mghanistan during U.S. military operations there. Mter being
captured, these individuals were transferred to the Guantanamo Naval
Base, Cuba, and have been held there to the present day.71
On February 19,2002, the relatives ofShafiq Rasul, a detainee in the
Guantanamo Bay Base, filed a habeas petition in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia. 72 In their petition, President George W.
Bush was named as a respondent. 73 The district court held that because
the petitioners were located outside of the United States, the court
could not grant them the relief requested. 74 The court based its
holding on the fact that Guantanamo Bay Base is technically Cuban
territory, held by the U.S. under the terms of a (nearly) perpetual
lease. 75 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
unanimously affirmed. 76 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address the question of "[w]hether United States courts lackjurisdic-

69. ld. at 2725.

70. ld. at 2718 n.9.
71. Rasu~ 124 S. Ct. at 2690-91.
72. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub nom. AI Odah v. United
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). Rasul's
petition was consolidated with several others, but the backgrounds of these cases are quite similar,
so there is little need to identify each plaintiff and his specific circumstances.
73. SeeAl Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
74. Rasu~ 215 F. Supp. 2d at 72-73.
75. ld.
76. AIOdak, 321 F.3d at 1143.
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tion to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign
nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.'>77
The Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Rasui together with
the two other Enemy Combatant Cases. The decision was unexpected.
The court ruled, 6-3,78 that foreign citizens being detained by the U.S.
Government have the right to have U.S. courts hear their challenges to
the legality and the propriety of that detention. 79 The decision is
notable for several points. First, it is the first time that the Court
explicitly stated that foreign citizens located outside of the United
States can sue the U.S. Government. 80 Second, the Court focused on
the fact that, although Guantanamo Bay Base is technically Cuban
territory, the United States has exercised, exercises, and likely will
continue to exercise full jurisdiction and control over the territory for
the foreseeable future. Therefore, according to the Court, the Guantanamo Base should be treated as if it actually were sovereign U.S.
territory.81 The focus on Guantanamo's unique status makes it difficult
to judge how far down the battlefield the Court is willing to interpose
itself.82 Next, unlike the decision in Hamdi that explicitly allowed for
adjudicatory proceedings to occur before a military tribunal (or com-

77. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Rasul v. Bush, 2003 WL 22428935 (Sept. 2, 2003);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (mem.) (order granting certiorari).
78. Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion in which Justices O'Connor, Souter,
Breyer, and Ginsburg joined. Justice Kennedy concurred in judgment. The Chief Justice and
Justice ThomasjoinedJustice Scalia's dissenting opinion. Rasu~ 124 S. Ct. at 2686.
79. Rasu~ 124 S. Ct. at 2698; see also id. at 2706 (Scalia,]., dissenting) (stating that the majority
"for the first time" allowed aliens outside the United States to sue for habeas relief).
80. The Court's previous opinions did raise such a possibility, but the extent of those
opinions was not clear until RasuL See Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
Then again, as discussed in this Article, the extent of Rasul is far from clear as well, and we most
likely will have to wait for another pronouncement from the Court in order to have a clearer idea
of the rights and obligations of the U.S. Government vis-a.-vis foreign nationals.
81. See Rasu~ 124 S. Ct. at 2696-97.
82. The Court was careful to specifY that it held only that the "District Court [has]
jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base." [d. at 2698 (emphasis added). The Court could have just as easily
ended the above sentence with the word "detention," without speciJYing the location of that
detention. The fact that it chose to add "at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base" may mean that the
decision applies only to Guantanamo, and does not extend beyond it. Nonetheless, in light of the
Court's view that in order for the Great Writ to be granted only the respondent must be within the
court's geographical jurisdiction, it cannot be ruled out that the Rasul decision extends beyond
Guantanamo's gates. See infra Part N.
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mission), the Rasui decision makes no such concession. 83 Finally, Rasui
is notable for the fact that in the entire 45-page decision, RumsJeid v.
Padilla, a case ostensibly decided by the same Court, with the same nine
Justices, is mentioned only once, and only injustice Scalia's dissent. 84 It
is these last two points that make the Court'sjurisprudence in this area
incoherent.

III.

THE TENSION BETWEEN THE THREE DECISIONS

As alluded to above, the three decisions handed down by the
Supreme Court onJune 28, 2004, neither are a model of clarity nor do
they fully harmonize with one another. Indeed, each of the opinions
completely ignores the existence of the other twO. 85 Given the fact that
an unambiguous resolution of all three cases would greatly illuminate
the legal problems surrounding the ongoing "war on terror," the
Supreme Court's performance is, to say the least, inadequate. This Part
discusses how, by failing to provide the Executive and the lower courts
with proper guidance, the Supreme Court assured itself of further
litigation and continued uncertainty regarding detainees' rights and
the powers of the Government.
A.

The Interaction oJHamdi and Rasul

The majorities for Hamdi and for Rasui were quite different,86 so
perhaps it is no surprise that the decisions read differently. Yet Justice
O'Connor and Justice Kennedy, who both agreed with the conclusion
that U.S. citizen "enemy combatants" may not necessarily be entitled to
adjudicate their claims in federal courts, so long as they have some
avenue of challenging their status,87 expressed no such certainty in
cases of non-U .S. citizen "enemy combatants." Furthermore, the remaining members of the Rasui majority either explicitly rejected or, at the
very least, cast grave doubt on their acceptance of a "truncated" habeas

83. Granted, the Court did not say that such a procedure would be inappropriate. However, it
is noteworthy that the Court explicitly authorized proceedings in the military system with respect
to a U.S. citizen, but declined to do so (though reserving that question) in the case of foreign
nationals.
84. 124 S. Ct. at 2711 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
85. Not one opinion even cites to the other two, except in concurrences or dissents.
86. Compare Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2633, with Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2686.
87. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (plurality opinion); Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2686 (majority
opinion); id. at 2699 (Kennedy,]., concurring).
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process for "enemy combatants.,,88 Reading the two decisions together,
one is struck by the failure of Rasul's majority or concurrence even to
mention the possibility of litigating a detainee's status in a non-Article
III court. In other words, it may well be that the import of Hamdi and
Rasulis that the Government may not adjudicate Guantanamo Bay Base
detainees' status in military tribunals but may do so for U.S. citizens
detained on U.S. soi1. 89 If this conclusion sounds improbable, that is
because it is. It may well be that if and when the issue of sufficiency of
process for Guantanamo Bay Base detainees reaches the Supreme
Court, a different majority may conclude that military commission
status review is sufficient. 90 However, it is, to say the least, sloppy
decision-making and opinion-writing not only to leave the question of
the type of process due to the non-citizen detainees open but also to
completely fail to even mention the issue. The sloppiness is all the more
obvious in light of the fact that this very issue was discussed in some
detail with respect to American U.S. citizen detainees. 91
Additionally, although Hamdi makes relatively clear the consequ~nces of finding a U.S. citizen not to be an enemycombatant,92 Rasul
leaves that question open with respect to non-citizens. There is no
question that the U.S. Government may prosecute Mr. Hamdi (or Mr.
Padilla) in criminal courts. 93 Indeed, the Government already has
exercised such an option with respect to another so-called American
Taliban. 94 It is altogether unclear whether criminal procedures can be
applied with the same force and effectiveness to non-citizen detainees.

88. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2652-53 (Souter,]., concurring injudgment); id. at 2660 (Scalia,
]., dissenting). As noted, supra note 33, in Hamdi,Justice GinsburgjoinedJustice Souter's opinion,
while Justice StevensjoinedJustice Scalia's opinion.
89. Indeed, the Government quickly moved to provide detainees with a military "Review
Commission," but some legal scholars already expressed reservations as to the sufficiency of such a
mechanism. See Christopher Marquis, Pentagon Will Permit Captives at Cuba Base to Appeal Status, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2004, at A4 (describing the proposed process and stating that legal experts have
expressed doubts about the constitutional adequacy of new procedures).
90. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
91. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2651-52.
92. Although the opinion itself does not mention what such consequences would be, if Mr.
Hamdi and Mr. Padilla indeed did what they are accused of doing, there is little question that they
could be prosecuted in a regular criminal trial. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2000) (specifYing the
type of prohibited terrorism-related conduct and penalties therefor); § 2339A (prohibiting
provision of any aid to terrorists).
93. See supra note 92.
94. See Indictment of John Phillip Walker Lindh, United States v. Lindh, Crim. No. 02-37a
(E.O. Va. Feb. 5, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/lindh/uswlindh020502cmp.
pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2004); see also Plea Agreement ofJohn Phillip Walker Lindh, United States v.
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Although U.S. laws do allow for prosecution of foreign nationals for
crimes committed against U.S. citizens, even if such crimes are committed on foreign soil,95 it is altogether unclear that resisting invading U.S.
forces is a crime.96 Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute that it is quite
undesirable (at least from the U.S. perspective) to have anyone offer
armed resistance to U.S. forces and that it is even less desirable to have
anyone perpetrating acts of terrorism in a region where the United
States may have vital interests (whether or not these acts are targeted at
U.S. citizens). It then follows that it is desirable to isolate and detain
individuals who have or may impede the progress of U.S. forces abroad.
This is not the same as advocating for preventive detention but merely a
recognition of the fact that someone may have been a member of the
Taliban (perhaps even a high-ranking member) and yet not have been
a combatant. If one is not a combatant, it is doubtful that he could be
an "enemy combatant;" nonetheless, it may not be prudent to release
former Taliban members when the situation in Afghanistan is far from
stable. The U.S. Government may then be faced with an untenable
situation. If the detainee is able to show that he was not a combatant,
presumably the courts would be bound to order the military to release
that individual. In the case of a U.S. citizen, the Government may then
continue to detain this individual in connection with any criminal
prosecution that it may bring. 97 However, in the case of a non-citizen, it
is altogether unclear what actions the Government can take to prevent
the return of this individual to the zone of ongoing conflict. The
practical result of the Court's decisions, therefore, is to give the
Government more options with respect to U.S. citizens and fewer
options with respect to non-citizens. The result is counter-intuitive and
in all likelihood wrong or, at the very least, unintended. In either case,
the result suggests that the Court lacked sufficient intellectual rigor to
resolve the two cases in a manner in which at the very least the U.S.
Government is not more constrained with respect to non-citizens than
it is with respect to U.S. citizens.

lindh, Crim. No. 02-37a (E.D. Va. Feb. 5, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
lindh/uslindh71502pleaag.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
95. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2000).
96. Although § 2332(c) of Title 18 provides for penalties for anyone acting with intent to
cause serious injury to a U.S. national (and it can be safely assumed that anyone firing on U.s.
soldiers intends to cause such injury), international law prohibits the prosecution of those
engaged in legitimate anned conflict between nations. See generally Geneva Convention, supra note
15, art. 4 (recognizing that captured members ofthe opponent's anned forces are POWs and not
common criminals).
97. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
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B.

The Interaction of Padilla and Rasul

The inconsistencies between Hamdi and Rasul are not the only ones
that are present in the trio of decisions. There are also glaring inconsistencies and omissions between Padilla and Rasul. This Part is dedicated
to illuminating the flaws in these decisions.
The Padilla Court recognized that, although the courts may be a
necessary counterbalance and check on the Executive's ability to
indefinitely detain individuals, the jurisdiction of the courts is limited.
The Supreme Court was understandably wary of prisoners challenging
their detention in a variety of jurisdictions, hoping to have their case
heard by a more sympathetic set of judges. 98 The Court also understood that the Executive would be unduly hampered if it had to defend
against habeas proceedings in a variety of jurisdictions. 99 Taking all
these facts into account, the Court, consistent with its prior rulings,
limited prisoners' ability to litigate to the jurisdiction where their
immediate captor is located. No such restriction was placed on nonU.S. citizen individuals held outside the U.S. sovereign territory.
In Padilla the Court recognized that U.S. laws allow federal courts to
hear habeas petitions only within their territorial jurisdiction. 100 At the
same time the Court recognized that since the Great Writ is directed to
the jailer, the jailer (as opposed to the prisoner) must be within the

98. See Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2725. I do not mean to imply that some judges are less cognizant
of the limits of their judicial power or are automatically more predisposed to rule against the
Government and for the detainee. However, it should be beyond dispute that some judges take a
broader view of rights guaranteed to prisoners under the laws and the Constitution of the United
States than do others. Compare 20 Questions for CircuitJudge Stephen Reinhardt of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Justice William Brennan ... had a broad and generous, rather
than a cramped and niggardly, view of the law and its functions."), available at http:/ /
legalaffairs.org/howappealing/20q/2004_02_0 1_20q-appellateblo~archive.html (last visited Jan.
21,2005), with 20 Questions for Circuit Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Apart from Judge Hand's superb craftsmanship, I admire his
skepticism with respect to his proper role as an unelectedjudge in a democratic society, which led
to his modest approach to judging, and to his advocacy of judicial restraint."), available at
http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing/20q/2003_03_01_20q-appellateblo~archive.html (last visitedJan. 21, 2005) (Both judges were responding to a question that asked them to identifY "one
federal or state court judge, living or dead, whom you admire the most and explain why."). It
would therefore stand to reason that prisoners would prefer to litigate in front of the first rather
than the second set ofjudges.
99. Seeid.
100. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2722 ("[F]or ... habeas petitions challenging present physical
confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement.").
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territorial jurisdiction of a given district court. 101 Of course, in the case
of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, neither the jailer nor the prisoner is
located within the jurisdiction of any district court. Other U.S. territories have specific district courts to adjudicate cases arising in that
territory.102 Thus, Congress clearly knew how to create a court that
would have jurisdiction for cases arising outside of the fifty states.
Congress also knew how to hold territory without creating federal
district court jurisdiction. 103 That Congress has failed to create a
district court with jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay Naval Base is
beyond dispute. It is therefore clear that no district court has jurisdiction over either the prisoner or the immediate jailer. Yet the Supreme
Court easily dispensed with this problem and allowed Guantanamo Bay
detainees access to U.S. courts. The Court achieved this result by
allowing the detainees to sue the President as the 'Jailer-in-chief.,,104
Although the decision to allow Guantanamo Bay Naval Base detainees to challenge their detention in court "solved" the problem of
having no specific court to hear detainees' claims, it created a different
problem by essentially allowing any court to hear those claims.l05 That
of course places Rasul in direct conflict with Padilla. Once again, the

101. [d. at 2723 ("[H]abeas jurisdiction requires only 'that the court issuing the writ have
jurisdiction over the custodian. ''') (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 495).
102. For example, there is a District Court for the District of U.S. Virgin Islands, with the
Third Circuit having appellate jurisdiction. See 48 U.S.C. § 1611 (2000). There is also a District
Court for the District of Guam and a District Court for Northern Mariana Islands, with the Ninth
Circuit having appellate jurisdiction. See 48 U.S.C. §§ 1424, 1821 (2000). Additionally, there is a
District Court for Puerto Rico with the First Circuit having appellate jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.c.
§ 119 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 41(2000) (defining composition of federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals).
103. Indeed, as far back as 1810, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress can hold
territory and assign such powers to the judiciary within that territory as it deems advisable. SeeSere
v. Pitot 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332,336-37 (1810) (emphasis added):

The power of governing and of legislating for a territory is the inevitable consequence
of the right to acquire and to hold territoI]'... . Accordingly, we find Congress
possessing and exercising the absolute and undisputed power of governing and legislating
for the territory of Orleans. Congress has given them a legislative, an executive, and a
judiciary, with such powers as it has been their will 10 assign to those departments
respectively.
104. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698 (stating that the District Court for the District of Columbia
has jurisdiction over the custodian, with the implication being that the custodian is the named
respondent, i.e., the President).
105. See id. at 2711 (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("[U]nder today's strange holding Guantanamo
Bay detainees can petition in any of the 94 federal judicial districts.").
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Court created a situation where non-citizens held outside the United
States are in a more advantageous position than U.S. citizens held
within the United States. As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, "[t]he
fact that extraterritorially located detainees lack the district of detention that the statute requires has been converted from a factor that
precludes their ability to bring a petition at all into a factor that frees
them to petition wherever they wish-and, as a result, to forum
shop.,,106
The Court apparently recognized the incoherence of such an approach and signaled that perhaps the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia is the only appropriate forum to hear Guantanamo Bay Naval Base detainees' claims. While Rasul was being
decided, another case was pending before the Court. 107 In that case, a
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base detainee's brother filed a habeas corpus
petition on behalf of his detainee-brother in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California. !Os Contrary to the D.C. Circuit's
holding, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it
had jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition. 109 On June 30, 2004, the
Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment in an unsigned
order and remanded the case to that court to reconsider in light of
Padilla. 110 This action indicates that the Supreme Court is at the very
least uncomfortable with the notion of Guantanamo Bay detainees
litigating in any of the 94 judicial districts and, consequently, forum
shopping. Nonetheless, adjudicating by cryptic orders is not a paragon
ofjudicial lucidity and gives little guidance to lower courts as to why the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (which is without
jurisdiction as to Guantanamo Bay) is a better (or more appropriate)
forum than the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
(which is also without jurisdiction as to Guantanamo Bay). Mter all, the
President (in his official capacity) is amenable to the service of process
(and thus jurisdiction) in any judicial district, and given the resources
of the federal government it is unclear why it would be inconvenient to
litigate these cases in a federal district court other than the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia. In actuality, it may well be that the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida is a more
appropriate forum than the U.S. District Court for the District of

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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See Bush v. Gherebi, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004).
Gherebi v. Bush, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003).
Gherebi, 124 S. Ct. at 2932.
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Columbia; after all, the former is geographically proximate to Guantanamo Bay, while the latter is quite far removed. Hence, it is altogether
unclear why the D.C. District should have exclusive jurisdiction over
Guantanamo Bay.
The uncertainty created by the interaction of Padilla and &sul is
eviden t in the Nin th Circuit's decision in Gherebi on remand. III There,
the Ninth Circuit held to the view that it possessed jurisdiction to hear
cases from Guantanamo Bayll2 but held that transfer to the D.C.
District Court was appropriate. ll3 The Court of Appeals did not concede that the transfer was mandatory and, indeed, cited as the basis for
the transfer both 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (discretionary transfer for convenience of the parties) and § 1406 (mandatory transfer if venue is
improper and a party makes a timely objection) .114 Thus, it seems that,
although federal courts will transfer cases from Guantanamo Bay to the
D.C. District out of prudential considerations, it is not altogether clear
that the courts would view themselves under an obligation to do so.
Therefore, as a matter of rights, the Guantanamo Bay detainees are in a
better situation than U.S. citizens detained in Charleston.
IV.

THE IMPACT OF THE ENEMY COMBATANT CAsES ON MILITARY
OPERATIONS

Beyond the internal inconsistencies, the Enemy Combatant Cases
have a potentially far-reaching impact on the future operations of the
U.S. military and intelligence-gathering services. 1l5 To be sure, the
Court did use language that could be viewed as carefully circumscribed,
yet, if one takes the logic of the decisions to its ultimate conclusion, the
results could well be grotesque. 1l6
It is true that the writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy
and is generally available only when there are no other means of

Ill. See Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2004).
112. Id. at 738 ("In sum, we hold that neither Johnson v. Eisentrager nor any other legal
precedent precludes our assertion of jurisdiction over Gherebi's habeas petition.") (emphasis
added).
113. Id. at 739.
114. Id.
115. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia,]., dissenting) ("The consequence of this holding, as
applied to aliens outside the country, is breathtaking. It permits an alien captured in a foreign
theater of active combat to bring a § 2241 petition against the Secretary of Defense.").
116. See id. at 2706.
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securing the Government's compliance. 1l7 The "Great Writ," as it has
been called, is the last resort of the imprisoned. I IS That, in and of itself,
however, should not be sufficient to craft new rules of jurisdiction and
expand courts' powers to areas traditionally reserved to Congress and
the Executive. If habeas is so used, no principled reasons exist as to
why, in the same situation, other extraordinary remedies available to
the judicial branch should not be employed with equal force.
In the course of its military operations in Mghanistan, the U.S. forces
captured a number of Taliban and al-Qaeda members, many of whom
were not Mghani citizens. 1l9 Mter detaining and interrogating them,
these individuals were often turned over to their home governments. 120
Additionally, U.S. forces have employed interrogation methods that
certainly would not pass muster in U.S. jails. For example, in interrogating Abu Zubaydah, a high-ranking al-Qaeda operative, U.S. forces
withheld painkillers, despite the fact that Mr. Zubayda was suffering
from several gunshot wounds. 121 Other methods specifically designed
to humiliate the prisoners have also been employed. 122 All of these
have occurred while the suspects were in U.S. custody and under U.S.
control. If one takes the Supreme Court at its word-that it is not the
territorial sovereignty but the actual physical custody that gives the
federal courts jurisdiction-it then follows that all of these practices are
subject to judicial review. Accordingly, the prisoners held by the U.S.
military and intelligence services (regardless of where they are held)
can petition the U.S. courts for writs of habeas corpus or other
extraordinary relief. 123 For example, following the Supreme Court's
logic, there is no particular reason as to why individuals being held by
U.S. forces in foreign countries could not petition for a writ of

117. See Wade v. Mayo, 334 u.s. 672, 694-95 (1948) ("[F]ederal courts should not utilize
habeas corpus ... except in extraordinary situations where otherwise the accused would be
remediless.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
118. C! Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) ("Since habeas corpus is an
extraordinary remedy whose operation is to a large extent uninhibited by traditional rules of
finality and federalism, its use has been limited to cases of special urgency, leaving more
conventional remedies for cases in which the restraints on liberty are neither severe nor
immediate.").
119. For example, prisoners in Rasulwere not Mghani citizens. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690.
120. Don Van Natta,Jr. et aI., Threats and Responses: Interrogations; Questioning Terror Suspects In
a Dark and Surreal World, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at AI.
121. Id.
122. Id.

123. See 28 U.S.c. § 1651 (allowing federal judges to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate
in aid oftheir respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles oflaw").
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prohibition or a writ of mandamus. 124 Through these writs the detainees could attempt to prevent the United States from transferring them
to third countries or to require the United States to provide them with
medications or other items that the prisoners deem necessary. It is
conceivable that Saddam Hussein, who is being physically held by U.S.
forces (though legally in Iraqi custody) 125 could petition the District
Court for the District of Columbia seeking a prohibition from being
physically turned over to the new Iraqi authorities. 126 Surely, this
cannot be the result envisioned by the Supreme Court.
It may be argued that the courts would reject most, if not all, of such
claims and would give due deference to military operations. That
answer does not suffice. Even if the courts eventually reject the detainees' claims, it would still be an unbelievable imposition on field
commanders to respond to the prisoners' claims. It would be an even
larger imposition on U.S. foreign policy to have to explain to a federal
judge the return of prisoners to their home countries.
In addition to the potential parade of horribles that has been
ushered in by the Supreme Court, there are unanswered practical
questions even in the limited situation of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
It seems beyond dispute, and the Supreme Court has recognized, that
the interrogation of detainees can and does serve an invaluable military
and intelligence-gathering function. 127 It should be equally obvious
that effective interrogation cannot be completed in a matter of hours
or often even days.128 All too often, weeks and months are necessary to
pry even a minute amount of information from an unwilling de-

124. See Rasui, 124 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia,]., dissenting) ("The consequence of this holding, as
applied to aliens outside the country, is breathtaking. It pennits an alien captured in a foreign
theater of active combat to bring a § 2241 petition against the Secretary of Defense."). If § 2241
can be utilized by non-U.S. citizen prisoners held abroad, there is no reason why § 1651 cannot.
Mter all, writs of mandamus and prohibition are also directed at the government official and not
at the prisoner. Therefore, the jurisdictional question is no different in these cases than in RasuL
125. See Ian Fisher & John F. Burns, Court Hands Legal Custody of Saddam Hussein to Iraq, N.Y.
TIMEs,June 10,2004, atA10.
126. This is more than mere fanciful speculation. For example, the Supreme Court was
presented with a petition to review Saddam Hussein's detention. The Court declined it because
Mr. Hussein did not personally sign an affidavit of indigency. See In re Saddam Hussein, 125 S. Ct.
239 (2004) (mem.) (order denying petition to proceed in forma pauperis without affidavit of
indigency executed by petitioner).
127. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2651 ("An interrogation by one's captor, however effective an
intelligence-gathering tool, hardly constitutes a constitutionally adequate factfinding before a neutral
decisionmaker.") (emphasis added).
12~. See, e.g., Van Natta, supra note 120 (discussing interrogations that have lasted days).
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tainee. 129 A fortiori, it is necessary to keep such detainee from contacting the outside world, lest such contacts reinforce his strength and
resolve to resist American interrogators. 13o It then follows that the
prolonged incommunicado detentiori of these individuals is of paramount importance to U.S. security.
The question therefore arises: at what point should the detainees be
able to petition the courts for a writ of habeas corpus? Generally, when
an individual is detained in the Unite States, he has a right to be
brought before a magistrate within forty-eight hours of detention. 131
Bringing a person captured in the field of military operations and
suspected of being a member of a terrorist organization before a
magistrate within forty-eight hours is not just impractical, it is impossible. Thus, a new timeframe must be designed. However, given the
highly individualistic approaches to interrogation, a one-size-fits-all
rule is likely to prove counterproductive. In the criminal context, the
one-size-fits-all approach works because, at the end of the day, all
defendants are entitled to the same basic rights at trial.
In the case of terrorism detainees, however, there may never be a
trial, as it is not at all clear that they violated any U.S. laws. The purpose
behind holding these individuals is twofold. First, they are held to
prevent them from rejoining their comrades in arms in their fight
against U.S. forces. Second, and more pertinent, they are held in order
to elicit information on the whereabouts and plans of other al-Qaeda
officials. As already explained, eliciting this information could take
months. 132 Allowing people to meet with attorneys before that time
may, and likely will, impede the investigation. 133 Furthermore, prior to
obtaining any information, it may be difficult for the Government to
show to the satisfaction of the court that the individual in question is
indeed an enemy combatant and does indeed consort with terrorists.
Thus, by hearing habeas petitions too early, the courts may impede the
Government's ability to gather information and to effectively conduct
military and anti-terrorist operations. On the other hand, it is altogether unclear what point in time the courts will view as not too early.
In any event, detainees will be tempted to seek habeas review early and

129. [d. ("The officials say the most effective interrogation methods involve a mix of
psychological disorientation, physical deprivation and ingratiating acts, all of which can take weeks
or months.") (emphasis added).
130. [d.
131. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
132. See supra note 129 and the accompanying text.
133. See supra note 130 and the accompanying text.
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often, thus interrupting the Government's information gathering. The
courts, of course, will have no guidance to decide when the person has
been detained long enough to vitiate any intelligence value that he may
have had at some point in time. This lack of ability to correctly judge
the necessary detention length will result in either inconsistent and
haphazard adjudication or, equally problematic, a too rigid standard
that may not be applicable (though it will be applied) to all situations.
In its decisions, the Supreme Court has essentially announced that
the principles underlying the U.S. criminal justice system also apply to
military detainees, although potentially in a scaled-back form. 134 However, the Court has failed to appreciate that the principles designed to
assure a fair trial have little, if any, application to a situation where
interrogation and prevention of future terrorist activity are the overriding issues. The Court has also extended judicial power to the areas
where it is least suited. Interposing the judiciary, however minimally,
between the U.S. military and individuals captured by U.S. forces is
likely to put a strain not only on military and intelligence operations
but potentially on U.S. foreign relations as well. 135
V.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF GRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

By now it should be clear that the Enemy Combatant Cases suffer
from internal inconsistencies and potentially lead to results not at all
envisioned by the Court. There is also an additional and absurd twist to
the Court'sjurisprudence in this area. It comes from the interaction of
the Enemy Combatant Cases and Zadvydas v. Davis,136 a 2001 ruling
from the Supreme Court.
In Zadvydas, an immigrant born in Germany but of Lithuanian
descent was being held by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) pending deportation. 137 However, Germany refused to accept
Mr. Zadvydas, claiming that he was not a German citizen despite having

134. See Rnsul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698 ("We therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the District
Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention
at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.").
135. Id. at 2711 (Scalia,]., dissenting) ("For this Court to create such a monstrous scheme in
time of war, and in frustration of our military commanders' reliance upon clearly stated prior law,
is judicial adventurism of the worst sort. ").
136. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
137. Id. at 684. Mr. Zadvydas was ordered deported in 1994, after Lithuania regained its
independence from the fonner Soviet Union. Id.
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been born there. I3s Lithuania also refused to accept Mr. Zadvydas,
claiming that he never became a Lithuanian citizen. 139 The INS tried to
deport Mr. Zadvydas to his wife's home country (the Dominican
Republic) but that, too, proved unsuccessful. 140 In short, Mr. Zadvydas
quickly became a man without a country. During the entire removal
process, which lasted for several years, the INS kept Mr. Zadvydas in
custody.141 Eventually, Mr. Zadvydas filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus claiming that the Government would never be able to remove
him from the United States (because no country was willing to accept
him) and, therefore, detention during the removal proceedings would
in effect amount to perpetual detention. 142 The Supreme Court agreed.
In a 5-4 opinion,143 the Court held that the Government may detain an
alien for the purposes of removal only for a "reasonable" period of time
and that, generally, six months is the outer limit of reasonableness. 144
Accordingly, the Court ordered that an alien who can show that there is
no likelihood of being removed in the "foreseeable future" must be
released from confinement. 145
The impact of Zadvydas on the situation of the Guantanamo Bay
detainees could be enormous. Let us assume a situation where a
detainee successfully challenges his "enemy combatant" status before
the court. Upon such a successful challenge, the court would issue a
writ of habeas corpus. The Government consequently would no longer
be entitled to hold the individual as an enemy combatant. Of course,
the Government could continue to detain that individual pending his
removal from the United States (or the U.S. base in Cuba) and,

138. Id. Mr. Zadvydas was born to Lithuanian parents who were held in a displaced persons
camp in Germany. His parents were not residents of Germany; Mr. Zadvydas, therefore, could not
lay a claim to German nationality. Id.
139. Id. Lithuanian law allows for descendants of people who held Lithuanian citizenship
prior to June 15, 1940, (the date of Lithuania's occupation and annexation by the USSR) to claim
Lithuanian citizenship in their own right. REpUBLIC OF LITHUANIA, lAw ON CITIZENSHIP § 1 (1)
(1991), available at http://www.litlex.lt/Litlex/Eng/Frames/Laws/Documents/55.HTM (last visited Nov. 2, 2004). Lithuania rejected Mr. Zadvydas' application for citizenship, stating that the
documentation of his parents' citizenship (through which he would derive his own) was inadequate.
140. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684.
141. Id. at 684-85.
142. Id.
143. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer's majority
opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas dissented. Zadvydas,
533 U.S. 678.
144. Id. at 701.
145. /d.
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presumably, back to the country of capture or origin.146
No doubt many countries whose citizens are currently held as enemy
combatants would allow these individuals to return home. 147 However,
the situation may not be that simple for everyone. A good number of
individuals captured in Mghanistan are not Mghani citizens. Indeed,
the lead plaintiff in &sul was a British citizen. 148 It is unlikely that
Mghanistan would be willing to accept these individuals. Unfortunately, there are no guarantees that the individual's country of citizenship would be willing to accept him back either. For example, the
country of citizenship could conceivably claim that the individual
expatriated himself by joining the Taliban. In fact, Saudi Arabia did
expatriate Osama bin Laden,149 thus precluding him from returning
there. Furthermore, there may be situations similar to that of Mr.
Zadvydas', where the individual in question does not hold citizenship
of any country. It is therefore not unfathomable that an individual
adjudged by the court not to be an "enemy combatant" would have no
country to which he could return.
If a situation such as the one described above arises, under Rnsul and
Zadvydas the Government would be obligated to release individuals
captured on the field of battle into American society.150 Such a result is
nothing short of absurd and grotesque. Yet it is the result one must
reach if one is to follow Rasul and Zadvydas to their logical conclusion.
The utter absurdity of such a result leads me to believe that the
Supreme Court could not have possibly intended it. This is the most
logical explanation. However, if this explanation is correct, the Court
should have at least foreseen this possibility. By failing to address the

146. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a) (6).
147. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, 4 Detainees Are Returned to France After 2 Years at Guantanamo, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2004, at A5; see also Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690 (detailing nationalities of various
petitioners, not one of whom was an Mghani national).
148. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690 n.1.
149. Jeff Gerth & Judith Miller, Terror Money: A Special Report; Funds for Terrorists Traced to
Persian Gulf Businessmen, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1996, at Al (stating that Saudi Arabia revoked bin
Laden's citizenship in 1994).
150. To be sure, the Supreme Court in Zadvydasdid leave itself an out by specitying that it was
not addressing a situation where terrorism was a concern. 533 U.S. at 696. That concession,
however, is quite meaningless, for under the scenario described above, we are assuming that the
courts have already determined that as far as they are concerned the individual seeking release is
not an enemy combatant and a fortiori is not a terrorist. This of course does not mean that the
person in question would not be considered dangerous by the military. Rather, it only means that
the district court in habeas proceedings wasn't convinced that the person has taken up arms against
the United States, and/or is dangerous.
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consequences of granting the writ of habeas corpus to prisoners of
undefined status (citizenship-wise), the Court has failed to give the
Government proper guidance for dealing with detainees. The Court, of
course, is not generally responsible for providing the Government with
legal guidance beyond adjudicating specific disputes; however, when it
radically changes the legal landscape, it should at the very least recognize and explain the consequences and pitfalls of its own decisions.

VI.

THE WAY OUT OF THE MORASS

Now that the Court has ruled and settled the issue of access to courts
for those captured on the field of battle, the question is not necessarily
whether the decision was right, but rather, what's next? Let there be no
mistake, for the reasons stated above, I believe that the Court erred, at
the very least, in the Rasul decision and was insufficiently clear in
Hamdi. Nonetheless, the decision has been made, and now the Government and the legal system must cope with the result. This Part proposes
a three-pronged approach to dealing with the Supreme Court's decisions. First, the lower-level courts, other than in the District of Columbia, should utilize their discretion and refuse to entertain habeas
petitions from Guantanamo Bay detainees. I51 Second, the courts should
allow military commissions to adjudicate detainees' claims I52 and limit
judicial review to the adequacy of the proceedings before the military
commissions. Third, in case a habeas petition is granted, the courts
should allow the Government to reclassifY detainees as prisoners of war,
thus allowing the Government the option of continuing to detain these
individuals until the end of hostilities.I 53 In cases where U.S. citizens
are granted the writ, the Government should be able to criminally
prosecute these individuals. I54 These limitations on the Court's decisions would curb any damage that the Court's decisions may have on
U.S. military and intelligence-gathering operations.
Letting only a single district court entertain habeas petitions from
Guantanamo Bay would address the problems that the Supreme Court
raised in Padilla. Detainees would be prevented from forum shopping,
and the Government would not have to defend various cases in a variety
of jurisdictions. Such an approach would also prevent non-citizen
detainees from enjoying greater rights than U.S. citizens. Thus, this

151.
152.
153.
154.
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approach would resolve the inconsistencies between Rasul and Padilla. 155
Next, allowing military commissions to adjudicate the status of
Guantanamo Bay Base detainees would appropriately balance the due
process concerns expressed by the Court and the necessities of U.S.
military and intelligence services. 156 By limiting detainees' forum to
military commissions, the Government would be able to ensure that
courts do not get involved prematurely, ruining any chance for successful interrogation. 157 This approach would also foreclose the possibility
of detainees petitioning U.S. courts for writs of prohibition on transferring them to other countries or writs of mandamus, requiring the U.S.
military to limit its interrogation techniques. Furthermore, this approach would resolve the tension between Hamdi and Rasul158 by
explicitly recognizing that the impartial factfinder could be a military
officer. Again, such a resolution would place U.S. and foreign citizens
on equal footing, rather than (inexplicably) giving non-citizens more
rights. Judicial review could still be available to verifY that military
commissions are not kangaroo courts willing to rubber-stamp the
Government's decision on the flimsiest of pretexts. Perhaps review
could be conducted under a deferential "substantial evidence" standard. Such a review would assure the court that there is indeed
evidence justifYing the classification of a prisoner as an enemy combatant, while at the same time giving sufficient deference to the military's
assessment of the situation as it existed on the field of battle where
presumably capture occurred. The Administration has already moved
forward with plans to set up such military review commissions. 159
Courts should hold that this process comports with the holding in
Rasul.
Finally, in the event that habeas is granted, the courts should at all
costs avoid the absurd situation described in Part V, supra. If habeas is
granted, the courts should allow the Government, at the Government's
election, to either release and deport these individuals or to continue
holding them as POWs rather than as enemy combatants. This approach has several advantages. First, if the Government chooses to hold
the detainees as POWs, it can continue doing so until the cessation of

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
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hostilities. 160 The determination of when hostilities actually end would
be squarely within the province of the Executive and Congress. 161
Courts will not have to guess as to when release is appropriate. This will
prevent these individuals from (re)joining forces adverse to the United
States. On the other hand, the detainees would be able to enjoy more
rights, such as the ability to receive visits from the Red Cross, to receive
mail and care packages, and to have the conditions of their confinement monitored for any potential violations by independent observers.162 In short, the detainees would come within the ambit of the
Geneva Convention's protections. In case a Zadvydas-like situation
arises after hostilities are declared over, the Government would be able
to keep the stateless individuals in a displaced persons camp, where
they too would receive the protections of the relevant international
treaties. 163 In such camps the Government could simultaneously seek
to deport these individuals and re-educate them, so that if deportation
is not possible, they could at some conceivable point be released. Such
a process would allow the authorities to hold individuals past the six
months limit established in Zadvydas, while at the same time ensuring
that the detained individual e~oys communication with the outside
world and other basic privileges.
These mechanisms are likely to limit the interfering impact that the
Court's decisions in the Enemy Combatant Cases may have on U.S.
military and intelligence-gathering operations. They are not ideal, and
possibly not exhaustive, but they are good initial steps towards reestablishing a balance between the needs of the military and the concern of
the courts.
VII.

CONCLUSION

On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court issued three seminal yet
contradictory decisions. The interplay of these decisions, as well as
their interaction with prior decisions of the Court, could impede the
U.S. fight against terrorism. However imprudent these decisions may
have been, the fact remains that today they are the law of the land.

160. See Geneva Convention, supra note IS, art. lI8.
161. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,214 (1962) ("[Elven in private litigation which directly
implicates no feature of separation of powers, lack of judicially discoverable standards and the
drive for even-handed application may impel reference to the political departments' determination of dates of hostilities' beginning and ending.").
162. See generally Geneva Convention, supra note IS.
163. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 2,19 V.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968).
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Short of overruling them (an unlikely prospect in the near term), legal
strategies meant to both implement the Court'sjudgments and protect
U.S. military and security needs must be devised. Among these strategies are limiting the forums for applications for the writ of habeas
corpus, allowing the facts to be adjudicated by a military commission,
with a deferential judicial review, and permitting the Government to
continue holding individuals who successfully petitioned for habeas
corpus, if the Government is willing to upgrade the status of the
detainees to that of a POW. Putting these limitations on the Supreme
Court's decisions may yet restore some coherence to the jurisprudence
in this area.
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